The article deals with neutral modalism, an approach in modal metaphysics and modal epistemology to the integration challenge for modalities. The integration challenge was proposed by Christopher Peacocke, who claims that its solution requires providing simultaneously acceptable metaphysics and epistemology for any given area of knowledge. In the article, I argue why modal realism cannot face the integration challenge and state the main reason for that, which is the lack of epistemic access to possible worlds that does not allow to formulate an adequate epistemology. To avoid this difficulty, I propose modalism as an alternative for modal realism. In the first part of the article, I analyze the main thesis of modalism, i.e., the idea that, in order to determine the meaning of sentences with modalities, the agent does not refer to possible worlds, but to the actual world. I consider different versions of modalism and choose the neutral modalism developed by Otavio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski. The reason for that is the epistemology of modalities they propose, which is compatible with any version of metaphysical modalism. This seems to be a very promising way to solve the integration challenge. The key point of this modal epistemology is that modal knowledge can be derived from non-modal knowledge. For example, knowledge about the possibility of a certain fact is derived from knowledge about this fact in the actual world. In the absence of this fact, knowledge about the possibility of this fact is derived from knowledge about a set of properties of the constituents of the objects of the actual world. Taken together, these principles of inference of modal knowledge make it possible to solve the integration challenge, since they do not require any metaphysical premises and at the same time explain how the meaning of modal sentences is determined. In the second part of the article, I present two objections to neutral modalism. First, Bueno and Shalkowski's theory does not take into account the specifics of metaphysical and logical modalities and explains the inference of modal knowledge only in the case of physical modalities and their analogues. Second, their modal epistemology requires an agent to have a high epistemic competence, while it is often possible to have modal knowledge even with a low level of this competence. Thus, neutral modalism has a limited expressive power and may be considered as only a partial solution to the integration challenge.